Structuralism -- Does it have to be Binary??

As the only, or, at least, one of the few, sociologist in class, I thought I should refrain from writing about the Durkheim's 'social facts' and Bourdieu's synthesis of phenomenology and objectivism. -- My hard drive is crammed with drafts and sketches involving the two!

This time I would like to pose a simple question, with regards to classical structuralism; that is, the structuralism without the prefix 'post-'. If we disregard Bourdieu – which I already promised I would – in think there were two of this week's readings that could be called 'structuralist', at least to some extent. Sahlins and Pratt.

Sahlins more clearly so; Pratt merely juxtaposes phenomena, such as 'dancing' and 'exercise'; 'professional' and 'play'; and, of course, how the (then: in the early 80s) emergent hybrid forms of aerobics and other 'jazzercise'. Just the fact that Pratt's short study analyzes the symbolism of a hybrid phenomenon reveals that a transgression of the classical structuralist binary form is admitted.

But Sahlins is more orthodox. Take his mention of clothes; he lists a whole range of adjacency pair, such as,

dull shiny
rough smooth
uneven flat
grainy slippery

...and so forth.

In relation to the class-specific tastes, Sahlins claims that, although clothes for blue-collar workers differ from those of whit-collar clerks, there is an analogy at all levels in that clothes for ceremony differ from those used for workmanship. I see no way to argue with this on a general level. But I simply ask how we are to interpret 'analogy'. Is it so that the difference between clothes for work, in one class, are equally distanced from ceremonial clothes there as in any other social class?

To be sure, Sahlins seems to think so: “It is thus a rule of analogy in the oppositions of ceremony/workmanship, at whatever level they may appear in the system. The terms of any opposition correspond to the terms of any other, such that the marked (ceremonial) costumes of any two classes resemble each other by an analogous differentiation from the unmarked (workmanlike) costumes of their respective classes” (pp. 186-88).

So... ceremonial clothes mean the same to people of all classes – at least in relation to working clothes. The scene is indeed laid for a structuralist interpretation of fashion: meaning inheres in the binary oppositions.
But is it impossible to imagine that meaning inheres in constellations of many objects? Maybe these constellations are different for different social classes and might even contain different objects at different times? If so, maybe ceremonial clothes do not mean the same for every social group?

I pose the question because it has for some time been curious to me that classical structuralism was so attached to Levi-Strauss's idea of binary opposites. Remember, structuralism grew out of de Saussure's semiology, which – to my understanding and knowledge – does not mention binary determinism. Rather, 'tree' means tree because it stands in relation and contrast to all other words of the English language. So that if I decided to say 'zoom-kah-bam' whenever I was referring to trees, no one would get it because 'zoom-kah-bam' does not stand in linguistic contrast to any word in English – not only one.

Couldn't it be that the same is true for cultural artifacts, such as ceremonial clothes? That they get their meaning depending on several pieces of fabric, and not just working apparels?

-- Alexander